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R. M. Hare 
 
 
Richard Hare left behind at his death a long essay titled ‘A Philosophical Autobiography’, which 
was published after his death.  Its opening is striking: 
 
I had a strange dream, or half–waking vision, not long ago.  I found myself at the top of a 
mountain in the mist, feeling very pleased with myself, not just for having climbed the 
mountain, but for having achieved my life’s ambition, to find a way of answering moral 
questions rationally.  But as I was preening myself on this achievement, the mist began to 
clear, and I saw that I was surrounded on the mountain top by the graves of all those other 
philosophers, great and small, who had had the same ambition, and thought they had 
achieved it.  And I have come to see, reflecting on my dream, that, ever since, the hard–
working philosophical worms had been nibbling away at their systems and showing that the 
achievement was an illusion (2002, 269). 
 
Yet his imagination could also be less modest: a gaggle of moral philosophers is trapped beneath 
the earth in a smoke–filled chamber; they talk at cross purposes, and refuse to take the way out 
into the open air that he alone has discovered.  It was his ambition to have united elements from 
Aristotle, Kant, and Mill in a logically cogent way that solved the fundamental problems of 
ethics (though with unfinished business); and he usually believed himself to have achieved this.  
For much of his career, his ‘prescriptivism’ formed an important part of the curriculum, certainly 
in Britain.  His disappointment was not to have persuaded others (an occasional ‘we 
prescriptivists’ was always uncertain of reference), and to have left no disciples; he once told 
John Lucas that this made his life a failure.  Yet he leaves behind generations of pupils grateful 
for the transmission not of a doctrine but of a discipline; and posterity, while unlikely to ratify 
the logical validity of his theory, will have reason to admire it for its uniting of apparent 
opposites, freedom and reason, tradition and rationalism, eclecticism and rigor. 
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1. The Life and the Man 
  
Richard Mervyn Hare was born at Backwell Down, outside Bristol, on 21 March, 1919.  He was 
to be known professionally as ‘R.M. Hare’, and personally as ‘Dick Hare’.  His father, Charles 
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Francis Aubone Hare, was director of a firm, ‘John Hare & Co.’, making paint and floor–cloth; 
his mother was Louise Kathleen Simonds, of a brewing and banking family.  His parents died 
while he was still young.  He was then cared for chiefly by guardians and relatives on his 
mother’s side, being sent to school first at Copthorne in Sussex, and then, from 1932 to 1937, as 
a classical scholar at Rugby.  He was awarded a scholarship to Balliol College in 1937, where he 
read two years of Greats before the outbreak of war. 
 Despite a largely classical education, Hare’s mind was already turning towards moral 
philosophy.  He ascribed this to two things, the need to define an attitude towards fighting, and a 
feeling of guilt at living in moderate comfort.  He spent much time while still at Rugby working 
with the unemployed, and finally decided not to be a pacifist, but to join the OTC.  When war 
broke out, he volunteered for service in the Royal Artillery, and circumvented the results of a 
medical test in order to be permitted active service overseas.  He was eventually put on a ship for 
India in autumn 1940.  He had a year training Punjabi soldiers, and enjoying some adventures 
(twice finding his own way back through the jungle, once after losing his guns to the Japanese).  
He was finally taken prisoner when Singapore fell in February 1942.  He then suffered a long 
march up the River Kwai to near the Three Pagodas Pass, with a group of officers whose task 
was to work as coolies building the railway from Siam into Burma.  So he knew too well the 
‘violent untiring labours’ that Aristotle associates with virtue in an ode to a dead friend that was 
dear to Hare’s heart.  He writes in his autobiography, ‘I prefer to pass over our sufferings during 
the eight months we were there’ (2002, 283); he rarely mentioned them (except when more 
fortunate critics of his views rashly imputed to him the exemption from other experience that can 
be the privilege of an Oxford fellowship).  He was eventually imprisoned with fellow officers in 
Singapore, whence he was released after exactly three and a half years when the War ended. 
 After the war, Hare returned to Balliol to complete the four years of Greats.  Even before he 
sat Finals, he was offered a lectureship at Balliol, which almost immediately became a 
fellowship.   Hare always claimed to have learnt a lot from his pupils, and his early years at 
Balliol granted him outstanding ones – four of whom, Bernard Williams, David Pears, Richard 
Wollheim, and John Lucas, were to join him both as professional philosophers, and as Fellows of 
the British Academy.  Lucas narrates how he and his contemporaries would plan a day’s 
campaigning, with a succession of tutees concerting, through the day, objections to some settled 
opinion of Hare’s, and replies to his replies – with Williams sent in last to deliver the coup de 
grâce that was never, in the event, fatal.  No one who never experienced Hare’s impromptu 
fielding of objections can really understand the resilience of even his less plausible convictions.  
And yet, despite some impressions, he was quite capable of admitting the force of fair counter–
arguments.  He had a faith that apparent disagreements can usually be resolved once confusions 
are removed.  (Whence the over–sanguine title of his last book, Sorting Out Ethics, 1997a.)  This 
went with a presumption that objections to his views rested on confusion, one that could lead to a 
degree of asperity.  He recognized that the brusquely economical format of his ‘Comments’ 
within Hare and Critics (which he seriously wanted to be titled, after a pub–name familiar in 
England, ‘Hare and Hounds’) might be taken amiss, ‘In case anybody thinks that I have been 
discourteous to my critics in writing notes instead of essays, I must point out that this is what we 
commonly do to Plato and Aristotle (as in the Clarendon series of commentaries), taking their 
arguments one by one and treating them briskly but seriously.’ 
 There could be a complaint that Hare was most interested in his own ideas.  John Lucas had 
from Tom Braun a Balliol rhyme (of which he cites a variant version in Lucas 2002, 31) dating 
from soon after the publication of The Language of Morals (1952): 
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My pupils I have always taught 
You cannot get an ‘is’ from ‘ought’. 
This is the burden of my song: 
‘It’s in my book, or else it’s wrong.’ 
 
It is true that Hare was most appreciative of points helpful to his own reconsiderations; he could 
then be depended upon to be over–generous.  He always disparaged his own scholarship, though 
from a demanding point of view.  (Few writers of long books on Plato can have first re–read the 
whole of Plato in Greek, as Hare did before writing his very short one, 1982.)  Yet his interests 
were wider in range than his publications, and extended through Frege, Chomsky, Davidson, and 
a fair range of contemporary philosophy of mind and language.  Though he was keen to claim 
ancestry (in a late encyclopedia article he counts Socrates and Aristotle as, in part, the first 
prescriptivists; 1998, 20), his love of philosophy did not reduce at all to a love of his own 
philosophy. 
His most amiable aspects were apparent to the undergraduates (by preference) whom, from 
early on, he invited to one of his reading–parties, first at Plas Rhoscolyn in Anglesey, and later 
also at Saffron House in Ewelme, beneath the Chilterns.  It was there above all that he vividly 
communicated a sense of how worthwhile and enjoyable it is not just to read but to do 
philosophy.  He was thus, however exacting his standards, a most positive figure as a mentor, 
giving of himself in discussion in a manner that could be opinionated but was also self–forgetful.  
He was a Puritan of the traditional kind who shared Dr Johnson’s approval of ‘harmless 
pleasures’.  He was concerned about the case against eating meat; but his eventual virtual 
vegetarianism was rather caused, he said, by gardening than by argument.  Some of his dislikes 
were distinctive, the music of Beethoven (which he came to find superficial), wearing socks 
(which he blamed on commercialism), drinking coffee (which he said affected his temper), 
travelling by train (which caused him anxiety), giving and receiving presents (when the recipient 
best knows what he wants).  Ved Mehta (1962) recalls his working, for freedom from 
interruption, in a caravan on the front lawn of his house in Oxford.  He had the courage, though 
not the extravagance, to be an eccentric. 
It was initially at reading parties that his pupils encountered a part of his life equally 
important to him as philosophy, his wife and children. What he describes as ‘a night of mostly 
bad dreams’, starting with his mother’s death in 1935, ended with his marriage in 1947 to 
Catherine Verney, which he calls ‘the best thing I ever did, and a source of lasting happiness’ 
(2002, 272 & 292).  They shared a love of traditional Anglicanism (though her beliefs were more 
orthodox than his), and of music (especially choral and a cappella).  A Hare reading party at 
Ewelme was always in part a music camp, with (for all those able to join in) a piano to play and 
madrigals to sing.  Everything equally involved their four children, John (who has published 
about his father, 2007, 184–248), and three daughters.  Without them, he would have felt 
incomplete even as a moral philosopher; for Aristotle’s question ‘What sort of person should I 
be?’ gave way, for him, to the question ‘What sort of person should I bring up my children to 
be?’ 
 Hare remained a tutor at Balliol for twenty years, and always felt attached to that institution 
above all others (whence the bequest of his Nachlass).  It was still during his time there, in 1964, 
that he was elected a Fellow of the British Academy.  However, ineluctable promotion 
eventually removed him, in 1966, to the White’s Chair of Moral Philosophy at Corpus Christi.  
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There he took on a responsibility for the supervision of research students.  (Balliol and Corpus 
Greats pupils still had the benefit of his reading parties, which for a time, while John was at 
Balliol, became biennial.)  He also took his turn as chairman of the Philosophy Panel, which 
admits and oversees graduates, and chairman of the Faculty Board.  Administration, it may  
be said, was a task with which he coped admirably, but, also admirably, refused to identify. 
He recalls that most of his cousins on his mother’s side were Americans; and two of his 
children emigrated to America and married Americans.  Like all distinguished Oxford 
philosophers, he received many invitations there (of which the most welcome was to the Center 
for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, where he wrote both Moral 
Thinking, 1981, and his little book Plato, 1982).  All this made less improbable his early 
retirement from Oxford in 1983, and his appointment as ‘Graduate Research Professor of 
Philosophy’ at the University of Florida at Gainesville.  One desire was to escape from faculty 
politics at Oxford.  A contributing factor was the publication of Moral Thinking, which left him 
immediately, he confessed, nothing new to say in his staple lectures.  Yet his main motive was 
the prospect of helping to set up a ‘Center for Applied Philosophy’.   
The very phrase ‘applied ethics’, now so familiar (and yet, one may think, tendentious), 
presupposes a tradition of ethical theories, such as his, that invite practical applications.  In fact, 
he published his first paper in practical ethics, titled ‘Ethics and Politics’, in the Listener (1955).  
(Part of it is collected, under the title ‘Can I be Blamed for Obeying Orders?’, in Hare 1972a; 
there it is followed by three papers originally published in the 1950’s, and more from the 
1960’s.)  Better known is the last chapter of Freedom and Reason (1963), which addressed the 
issue, then (it seemed) wholly recalcitrant, of apartheid.  And much else followed, with a stream 
of papers, and memberships of various advisory bodies (Hare 2002, 294–5).  He was engaged 
especially by urban planning, where he favored radial over ring roads, and biomedical ethics, in 
which he labored to be logical and not just bien pensant.  When a Society for Applied 
Philosophy was formed, he became its first President.  So he looked forward to a profitable 
refocusing of his energies, and this, to an extent, occurred, even when the Center partly 
disappointed, as he notes, three out of four volumes of essays published between 1989 and 1993 
fall within practical ethics (Hare 1989b, 1992a, 1993a). 
His time in Gainesville was disturbed by the first, and slightest, of his strokes.  When he 
fully returned with Catherine to Ewelme in 1994, further attacks cheated him of his hopes of 
continuing to combat ‘the usual misunderstandings’ (2002, 304–5).  He gave his last paper, 
appropriately, to an undergraduate audience at King’s College London.  He was still able to put 
together Sorting Out Ethics (1997a), deriving from the Axel Hägerström Lectures that he had 
given at Uppsala University in 1991 (when he also received an honorary doctorate – his first 
doctorate – from the University of Lund).  His eightieth birthday was marked by the publication 
of a final collection of papers, Objective Prescriptions and other essays (1999).  He died 
suddenly but peacefully on 29 January, 2002. 
  
2. ‘An Essay in Monism’ 
 
While on leave in 1940, Hare wrote twenty pages setting out ‘my philosophy’.  When Singapore 
fell, he looted a ledger from Changi jail, and started writing a monograph called ‘An Essay in 
Monism’.  He carried this on his back during the march, and completed it just before being 
released.  He typed it out, making multiple copies, once he was free.  He later dismissed it as 
‘containing mostly rubbish’ (Seanor & Fotion 1988, 201); even its Preface says it is ‘based, I 
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know, on insufficient reading imperfectly remembered’.  There are detectable influences from 
Alfred North Whitehead, Arthur Eddington, and – indirectly – Bertrand Russell’s neutral 
monism); yet it is already characteristic in its clarity, consistency, lucidity, and confidence.  It 
remains very little known (but see John E. Hare 2007, 200–7), and is of interest both in itself, 
and for points of connection with his mature thinking.  As it is only accessible within the 
archives of Balliol College, Oxford, I shall allow myself a density of quotation.  
 A central notion, initially put to work in relating mind and matter without dualism, is 
rhythm, which is an activity that unites a thing with its causes and effects.  The metaphysics that 
emerges is one of process rather than substance.  The identity of a ‘rhythm’ extends into its 
effects: ‘A rhythm is a series of occurrences which includes every effect caused by that rhythm; 
that is to say, a thing’s effects, or the energy which it gives off, are just as much a part of that 
thing’s entity as what we erroneously call its “matter”’ (ch. 4, p. 28).  As Hare recognizes, ‘This 
is nonsense if we are thinking of a “thing” as “a piece of matter”’ (ch. 4, p. 30); but this is 
changes if a ‘thing’ is analyzable as a series of occurrences, for there is then ‘nothing to prevent 
the same occurrence being part of several different series’ (ch. 4, p. 31).  The reality (as on 
certain contemporary views of personal identity) is that a ‘thing’ possesses not a definite 
boundary, but an indefinite periphery: ‘Within one rhythm certain occurrences are more remote 
(or more immediate) causes (or effects) than others.  That is to say, the coherence is stronger and 
more obvious at the centre than on the fringe.  The more remote causes of a rhythm count for 
less in the entity of that rhythm than the more immediate causes, and the same is true of effects.  
That is why in our everyday consideration of rhythms we are content to ignore its fringes and to 
grasp at the central part’ (ch. 4, p. 33).  Descartes’ inference from the experience of thinking to 
the existence of a thing that thinks is rejected as importing an unreal stasis: ‘The fact is the 
cognition, not the thing cognised … The “facts” of the world are not substantial objects, but 
events or occurrences.  In the grammar of existence, verbs are the vital words, not subjects or 
objects’ (ch. 9, p. 82).      
 It is an upshot that ‘things’ extend into one another in a way that might be represented by an 
overlapping series of sets of concentric circles: 
 
If two rhythms exist side by side in the same universe, rhythm A will in a certain degree be 
affected by rhythm B, and will in a certain degree affect rhythm B … A’s sphere of 
influence extends within the boundaries of B, and the influence is not uniform, but decreases 
as it gets further from its source.  To describe this concept we may borrow a term of 
Whitehead’s, ‘prehension’, B’s sphere of influence within the limits of A is called A’s 
‘prehension’ of B, and vice versa (ch. 7, p. 53).   
 
However, this may either enhance A’s individuality, or constrict it, depending on the manner in 
which A acts upon B: ‘When two rhythms prehend one another, their relations can be either 
friendly or antagonistic.  If A influences B in such a way as to fit in with B’s rhythm, the two 
rhythms may be said to be in sympathy.  In this case the two rhythms are united in a combined 
rhythm without losing their rhythmic individuality’ (ch. 7, p. 54). 
 One corollary of this is the adoption of an externalist view of perception:  
 
To isolate the body as something separate from our environment, is to regard perception as 
beginning suddenly when our bodies take part in it.  But, as we have seen, cognition is a 
process extending right from the object to ourselves; and whatever in this process is 
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consciously cognised by us, is cognition … Our cognition extends outside our bodies into 
our environment; or we may say that our bodies are merely a part of our environment; or 
better, that both bodies and environment are rightfully parts of our rhythms (ch. 10, pp. 91–
2). 
 
 Into this context Hare introduces talk of ‘value’ which is not easy to interpret, especially in 
light of his later views.  He distinguishes value from substance as he has distinguished substance 
from rhythm, but how rhythm and value relate is less clear: ‘The “factor” which determines a 
rhythm from another rhythm is not a factor of substance but a factor of value.  A rhythm is an 
interpretation of the universe according to its own standard of value; that is to say, it regards the 
events of the universe quoad itself, and as turning towards or cohering to itself, while turning 
away or being distinct from other rhythms …The same occurrence may have greater value from 
the point of view of one rhythm, less value from the point of view of another’ (ch. 4, p. 33).  This 
connects with the use of the word ‘I’, which should not be interpreted as referring to a substance: 
 
I am not setting up an ‘Ego’ which is something distinct from the cognition, something 
which would exist, even if the cognition did not take place.  Things are their actions; the 
action is the thing.  Therefore the cognition is part of me, and I do not exist apart from my 
experiences.  By saying that this cognition has reference to something called ‘I’, I mean that 
his event called a cognition coheres is a certain direction; it has a certain value … ‘Cognovi’ 
implies, not a subject and a verb, but an event cohering in a certain direction, possessing a 
certain value.  ‘I’ am that direction and that value.  I do not exist apart from my cognitions, 
any more than any Rhythm exists apart from its constituent events’ (ch. 9, p. 83).   
 
John Hare suggests (2007, 203 n.) that this anticipates Hare’s much later proposal (on which see 
§ 5 below) that there is a prescriptive aspect to the meaning of ‘I’.  It may be consistent with that 
the perspective within a rhythm identifies itself is also, and ipso facto, one within which there 
appear unequal values whose degree depends upon the centrality or marginality of some 
cognition to the process of which it is a part.  Hare can never have meant to imply a freedom 
whereby a man might relegate an event to a margin of a life, or even expel it beyond its borders, 
by adopting towards it a voluntary attitude of detachment. 
 We meet anticipations of the later dichotomy between fact and value, cognition and volition, 
that links Hare to David Hume.  Goodness is internally related to persons: ‘Goodness is Rhythm 
willed from within by a Person’; beauty is ‘Rhythm viewed from without by a Person through the 
exercise of sympathy’ (ch. 17, p. 38).  Hare already adopts the dichotomy, fundamental to his 
later philosophy, between cognition and will, ‘We say that a man cognises something when he is 
consciously affected by it; we say that he wills something when he consciously causes it … 
Cognition is the passive, will the active function of personality’ (ch. 8, pp. 63–4).  A person, 
therefore, is ‘the passage of a coherent system of cognition into a coherent system of will’ (ch. 8, 
p. 72).  However, he also recognizes that will presupposes cognition: ‘Will is so absolutely 
dependent on foreknowledge, that it I shard to imagine any effective act of will without some 
knowledge of the future. Consider for example the act of stretching out a hand; we could not will 
this, unless we were conscious that our hand would obey the behest of our will … 
Foreknowledge therefore, although logically distinct from will, is always a constituent of any act 
of will’ (ch. 15, pp. 22–3).  This anticipates Hare’s later insistence that a decision between 
alternative acts is ipso facto one between different sets of consequences: ‘It is the effects which 
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determine what I should be doing; it is between the two sets of effects that I am deciding.  The 
whole point about a decision is that it makes a difference to what happens; and this difference is 
the difference between the effects of deciding one way, and the effects of deciding the other’ 
(1952, 56–7). 
 Hare has applied Whitehead’s term ‘prehension’ to the overflowing of one man’s activity 
into the life of another.  He also envisages an exercise of love and sympathy that gives him entry 
into another life: ‘The meaning of love is that two persons “get inside” one another, so that the 
feelings of each become the feelings of both.  By Love we see through another’s eyes, hear 
through his ears, run with his feet, handle with his hands; and he does the same with ours … 
Thus it is through Love that the greatest and fullest extension of our person can be achieved, 
namely extension into the person of another’ (ch. 20, p. 70).  Much later (see his 1978, reprinted 
with second thoughts in 1989a), it was to become a question for Hare whether fully entering into 
the mind of another is sufficient to necessitate wishing for him what he wishes for himself, or 
only for forming wishes for what should happen to oneself were one in his shoes.  
 Very much later he was to regret his inability to convey more than ‘feebly and aridly’ 
supplementary reflections such as these: ‘The quality of mutual love and affection between 
people, without which our life would have few joys, cannot be had without the right dispositions; 
and these dispositions, therefore, are the condition of both happiness and morality’ (1981, vii).  
Here, within a chapter on ‘sin’, he is happy to follow Plato: ‘Successful tyrants – that is, those 
who use other people solely as means to their own selfish ends – have been few in history, and it 
is open to question whether any of them have been happy.  For no man can be truly happy by 
himself; most human happiness is a function of our association with other men ... Such 
association is barred to the man who has made other men hate him.  The person of a tyrant is 
inevitably stunted’ (ch. 18, p. 52). 
 
3. The Language of Morals 
 
Philosophically, Hare came under two influences that together led him to views that he could 
always retain.  One was emotivism.  He followed this in accepting a broadly empiricist view of 
facts that excluded moral facts in any unetiolated sense of ‘fact’.  However, he never adopted the 
verification principle of meaning in any thorough–going way.  He also recoiled from any causal 
account of ‘emotive meaning’ that reduced moral discourse to emotional manipulation.  It 
became a recurrent theme that emotivism went wrong by connecting the meaning of moral 
language with its perlocutionary, rather than its illocutionary, force (1997a, 112–14), that is, with 
what we do by or through using it, rather than what we do in using it. 
 The other influence was Kantian.  From H.J. Paton’s lectures on Kant, and articles by 
Reginald Jackson, he learnt that imperatives fall within the realm of reason.  This led him into a 
study of imperative logic, a topic already being explored in Scandinavia (especially by Alf Ross), 
but unfamiliar in Britain.  In his first published article, ‘Imperative Sentences’ (1949), in his 
essay ‘Practical Reason’ entered for the T.H. Green Moral Philosophy prize in 1950, and in his 
first book, The Language of Morals (1952), he explored the possibilities of inferring imperative 
conclusions from imperative, or imperative and indicative, premises.   
 The Language of Morals introduced a distinction between prescriptive and descriptive 
meaning.  Prescriptive meaning is defined in relation to imperatives: a statement is prescriptive if 
it entails, if necessary in conjunction with purely factual statements, at least one imperative; and 
to assent to an imperative is to prescribe action.  Descriptive meaning is defined in relation to 
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truth–conditions: a statement is descriptive to the extent that factual conditions for its correct 
application define its meaning.  It is taken for granted, in the tradition of Hume, that the factual is 
only contingently motivating: desire is no part of sincere assent to a purely factual statement.  A 
moral statement has prescriptive meaning, but may also be partly descriptive.  Thus ‘A [a person] 
ought to ’ entails the imperative ‘Let A ’, so that to assent to it sincerely is to have an 
overriding desire (which in application to oneself will amount, if its satisfaction appears 
practicable, to an intention) that A .  If there are agreed reasons for –ing within a linguistic 
community, say that it is enjoyable, ‘A ought to ’ may take on the descriptive implication of 
‘–ing is enjoyable’. ‘X is a good F’ prescribes choice within a certain range (e.g. for someone 
who is choosing an F); it takes on a descriptive connotation if there are agreed standards for 
assessing F’s. 
 Hare never said that ethical statements are imperatives; however, it is striking that non–
descriptive or evaluative meaning is defined in terms of imperatives.  This at once gave a clear 
sense to his endorsement of Hume’s denial that one can derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.  It also 
coincided, at least in appearance, with Kant, and was to become essential for later developments 
that brought results comparable to Kant’s.  However, a Humean who lacked Kant’s belief in a 
purely rational will might prefer to make ethical statements more loosely expressive of wish or 
desire, or even aspiration; and this could avoid what is everyone’s first objection to prescript–
ivism, that, intuitively, ‘I ought to ’ does not entail ‘I will ’ (expressing intention).  Hare took 
courage from the fact that Socrates and Aristotle incur much the same objection; as he liked to 
urge, Socrates wasn’t simply making a mistake.  His initial reply was that cases of failing to try 
to do what one admits one ought to do may involve psychological incapacity, or an off–color use 
of ‘ought’ that sheds its full prescriptive meaning.  He was to return more fully to the issue in a 
chapter of his second book, Freedom and Reason (1963), and again in a late encyclopedia article, 
‘Weakness of the Will’ (1992).  In this last piece he acknowledges that different things go wrong 
in different cases.  At times, the true story may even involve something like Plato’s partition of 
the soul (which was designed to accommodate conscious self–contradiction). 
 
4. The Logic of Imperatives 
 
Hare’s attempt to ground a logic of imperatives was innovative, but problematic.  One 
uncertainty is about its field.  He supposes that there is a genus of tellings to that extends over 
commands, orders, instructions, givings of advice, and even – when the imperative is self–
addressed – forming desires and intentions.  These belong together in sharing a direction of fit or 
onus of match that contrasts them with tellings that which convey information and express states 
of belief or of knowledge.  Crudely, if I tell you that p, and p is false, then, if anything, it is my 
utterance is out of order; if I tell you to do X, and you don’t do X, then, if anything, it is your 
action that is out of order.  The general idea is that, just as, if I tell you that p, I am implicitly 
telling you that q, if it is common knowledge between us that p entails q, so, if I tell you to do X, 
I am implicitly telling you to do Y, if we know that – well, this is what has to be determined.   
 It is arguable that the notion of implicitly prescribing fails to determine any logic of 
imperatives (Price 2004b, § 4).  Later papers of Hare’s focused upon various problem cases.   I 
shall consider three of these here, all of which admit possible solutions either proposed, or 
proposable, by Hare. 
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(1) The simplest examples involve only imperative sentences.  These may invite the simple 
thought that one imperative entails another if the first cannot be satisfied without the second 
being satisfied also.  (Hare identifies this as a ‘logic of satisfaction’; 1971a, 63.)  This may seem 
plausible in the following case: 
 
  (A) Do X and Y. 
  So, do X. 
 
Less plausible, however, may appear to be this: 
 
  (B) Do X. 
  So, do X or Y. 
 
(Hare discusses the following instance, ‘Post the letter; so post the letter or burn it; 1967, 25–34.)  
And yet it is equally true with (B) as with (A) that the premise cannot be satisfied without the 
conclusion being satisfied.  Moreover, (B) can be derived from (A) by contraposition and 
substitution.  If (A) is valid, so should (C) be: 
 
  (C) Don’t do X. 
  So, don’t (do X and Y). 
  So, do not X or not Y. 
 
 Then we have only to replace ‘don’t’ by ‘do’, and we have (B). 
 Williams (1962/3) judged (B) to be invalid, on the ground that its conclusion carried a 
‘permissive presupposition’ that the hearer may do X or do Y.  Hare defended it on the ground 
that the permission is a conversational implicature that is cancelled in the context defined by the 
premise ‘Do X.’ 
 However, even (A) may be less plausible than it looks.  Take this example (which comes 
from Bob Hale): 
 
  (D) Light the fuse and step back three paces. 
  So, light the fuse. 
 
It is certainly true that the conclusion reiterates part of what was prescribed in the premise.  And 
yet I may hesitate to tell someone to light the fuse, even when I am happy to tell him to light the 
fuse and step back, if I know that, given his tendency to be carried away, he is most likely, if he 
lights the fuse, not to remember to step back.  (As we might put the point in terms of possible 
worlds, I won’t tell him to light to fuse if the closest world to this one in which he lights the fuse 
is one where he forgets to step back.)  And how can I be telling someone implicitly to do a thing 
that I would be unwilling to tell him to do explicitly? 
 Again, however, Hare would presumably say that any suggestion that the hearer should 
focus upon lighting the fuse is corrected in context by the initial instruction that he then step 
back. 
 
(2) New problems arise when we have mixed inferences, indicative as well as imperative.  The 
simplest way of extending a logic of satisfaction to these is by the following rule, a set of 
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premises entails a conclusion if the premises cannot be true (if indicative) or satisfied (if 
imperative) without the conclusion between true or satisfied also.  However, we also need 
restrictive rules of which an example (already stated in 1952, 28) would be that no imperative 
conclusion can be drawn from purely indicative premises – but that is doubtless too simple.  
Take an example from Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium (7, 701a19–22).  It involves reasoning 
from one intention to another.  Given Hare’s willingness to represent intentions as self–addressed 
imperatives, we can rewrite it as follows: 
 
(E) Let me make a cloak. 
If I make a cloak, I must do such–and–such. 
So, let me do such–and–such. 
 
Here, if the second premise is true, the first premise cannot be satisfied without the conclusion’s 
being satisfied also; so the inference goes through on a logic of satisfaction.   
 Now this evidently needs to be restricted.  Take the following: 
 
(F) Let me get drunk. 
Whoever gets drunk is bound to have a hangover. 
So, let me have a hangover. 
 
It is true that, if I advise someone ‘Get drunk’, he might respond ‘Are you telling me to have a 
hangover?’  Yet this inference is not acceptable as leading from one intention to another; for 
predicted side–effects of realizing one’s intentions are not thereby intended, even if (in another 
case) they are welcome.  Inferences that may take one from one intention to another need rather 
to relate, like (A), to means towards, or ways of, achieving a given goal.   
 Yet further problems arise.  Suppose that I intend to achieve some unforgettable end, and 
recognize that it will require, in due course, a presently forgettable means.  (Suppose that I am 
already set on making a cloak, an end which already looms large in my mind; but some 
subsidiary means that I know to be necessary in due course can only become salient when the 
time approaches – I cannot now form an intention to realize the means since I know that I would 
at once forget it until my intention to realize the end reminded me, at an opportune moment, of 
the means.)  I then already intend the end, but cannot as yet seriously intend the means; for it is 
plausibly part of having an intention to do something that one expects one’s present intention to 
play a role in a causal sequence culminating in one’s doing it. 
 What would Hare say to all this?  He can reply that while a self–addressed imperative may 
express an intention, it can also fail to do so, and that this puts no limits on a logic of 
prescriptions.  If I tell someone to get drunk, knowing that this will produce a hangover, I am 
telling him to have a hangover, even without intending this.  Further, it was already a condition 
on a prescription’s expressing an intention that its realization appears to the subject to be 
practicable; it can now be added that I can only form an intention now if I expect it to contribute 
to the satisfaction of the prescription.  This then becomes a refinement, and not an objection. 
 
(3) A problem that we all face is how to reconcile the following two conditional imperatives.  (I 
take my example from Price 2008, 60; but it is of a kind that Hare was long conscious of, and 
discusses in Hare 1968.) 
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  (a) If you want to get drunk every evening, you should work in a bar. 
  (b) If you want to get drunk every evening, you shouldn’t work in a bar. 
 
These look contradictory, but need not be in any way inconsistent: (a) may be true in that 
working in a bar is the only way through which you can manage to get drunk every evening; (b) 
may be true in that, given that you are a potential alcoholic with a weak will, not working in a 
bar is a necessary condition of your maintaining your health (which you either are much 
concerned about, or ought to be).  We can distinguish (a) and (b) most clearly by asking how to 
detach the consequent.  This seems straightforward in the case of (b): one can detach ‘You 
shouldn’t work in a bar’ from (b) by asserting ‘You (do) want to get drunk every evening.’  But 
how, if at all, can we detach the consequent of (a)?   
 One answer might be that one can’t.  Another might be that one can, but only by deriving 
the consequent ‘You should work in a bar’ in a heavily qualified and contextualized sense: 
working in a bar may fit getting drunk every evening as a necessary means; hence one might say 
‘You should work in bar’, but only if it is implicit that the fittingness that ‘should’ connotes 
exists only in relation to the goal in question.  (So, of course, no recommendation of working in 
a bar follows.)  Hare, however, permits himself a bold solution.  He takes the clause ‘you want to 
get drunk every evening’ to be have different meanings in (a) and (b).  In (a), it is an embedded 
indicative, ascribing a desire to you – which is why the consequent can be detached by asserting 
‘You want to get drunk every evening.’  In (b), it is an embedded imperative, which would serve 
on its own for advising you to get drunk every evening; therefore the consequent can be 
detached, but only by prescribing ‘Do get drunk every evening.’ 
 The logic is then essentially the same as that of (E) above: 
 
   Get drunk every evening. 
   To get drunk every evening, you must work in a bar. 
   So, work in a bar. 
 
This then invites rewriting, by a licit logical manœuvre, as follows: 
 
   To get drunk every evening, you must work in a bar. 
   So, if get drunk every evening, work in a bar. 
 
However, since grammar excludes following ‘if’ by an imperative, it is replaced in the 
antecedent by a special use of ‘you want’. 
 This might be thought no less problematic than convenient for Hare: doesn’t it break the 
simple – if too simple – rule that no imperative conclusion can be derived from premises that 
contain no imperative?  However, that simple rule lacks application here; for the operator with 
widest scope in the conclusion is ‘if’, and not an imperative. 
 Of course, this proposal by Hare makes salient what has always been the gravest objection 
to a prescriptivist analysis of practical ‘ought’s (and ‘must’s): moral judgments cannot entail 
imperatives; for the content of a moral judgment can occur, whereas an imperative cannot occur, 
embedded in various contexts, such as an ‘if’–clause (forming a conditional antecedent), or a 
‘that’–clause (giving the content of a belief or assertion).  The objection was made strongly by 
Peter Geach in an article (1965) citing Gottlob Frege; so it has come to be known as the ‘Frege–
Geach’ objection.  Hare’s response is to be found in Hare (1970).  His solution to the problem as 
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it arises with conditionals derived from Gilbert Ryle’s notion of ‘inference tickets’ (1950).  The 
role of the quasi–English ‘If get drunk every evening, work in a bar’ is to yield an implicit 
prescription to work in a bar out of any prescription to get drunk every evening.  To press the 
speaker on what he is saying, and what might make it true, is therefore out of place.  What looks 
like a truth–apt proposition with a complex structure is really playing a quite different role: it is 
not a proposition, but a kind of rule. 
 Hare (1989) further hoped to reduce the paradox of an embedded imperative by making a 
distinction between two elements within the expression of a speech act: when a speaker says ‘Do 
X’, thereby telling a hearer to do X, he both issues a sentence in the imperative mood, fit for the 
communication of a command, and indicates that he intends so to be using it.  He calls a sign of 
the first a tropic, or sign of mood; this is to be distinguished from a neustic, or sign of 
subscription (like Frege’s assertion–sign).  When ‘Do X’ is embedded within a conditional 
antecedent, as can be expressed in English by ‘If you want to do X’, the tropic remains though 
the neustic disappears.  This is why it is the imperative ‘Do X’, and not the indicative ‘You are 
about to do X’, that releases the consequent. 
 With the occurrence of moral predicates within indirect speech Hare faced separate 
difficulties, and ones to which his solution is much less clear.  Many attempts have been made 
since to solve what is essentially the same problem, which arises with any view of moral 
judgments that denies that they are ‘truth–apt’ in the substantive sense of describing things, or 
presenting possible contents of belief about the way things are.  One may say of these attempts 
that they have certainly increased in sophistication, and possibly diminished in plausibility.   
 
5. Decisions of Principle 
 
The two features of prescriptivity and universalizability remained the twin pillars of Hare’s 
theory ever afterwards.  The term ‘universalisability’ was to become the title of a slightly later 
paper (1954/5) which also sorted out a confusion that causes real trouble in Aristotle and Kant.  
‘General’ terms (such as ‘man’ or ‘Greek’) contrast with ‘singular’ ones (such as ‘Socrates’).  
However, in the case of  maxims, one needs to keep two distinctions apart: a maxim may be 
‘universal’, rather than ‘singular’ or (ambiguously) ‘particular’, in referring to no individuals 
(unless within the scope of a preposition such as ‘like’ which converts the name of an individual 
into the vague specification of a kind); a maxim may also be ‘general’, rather than ‘specific’, in 
identifying a wide class of agent or act – a difference that is one of degree (so that the universal 
rule ‘Always give true evidence’ is more specific than ‘Always tell the truth’, and more general 
than ‘Always give true evidence on oath’).  Any discussion of the practicality and acceptability 
of ‘general principles’ needs to keep these distinctions apart.  Hare’s clarity on the matter is his 
most important non–disputable contribution to philosophy.  
In his essay ‘Practical Reason (1950), he had already argued that many decisions are 
decisions of principle not in deriving from a principle, but in establishing one.  As he remarked 
there, ‘It is not easier, but more difficult, to decide to accept a very general command like “Never 
tell lies” than it is to decide not to tell this particular lie … If we cannot decide even whether to 
tell this lie, we cannot, a fortiori, decide whether to tell lies in innumerable circumstances whose 
details are totally unknown to us.’  What, then, is to guide decision?  In the second part of his 
essay, he attempted to find a secure basis for moral reasoning in such concepts as ‘friend’; but he 
discarded that approach before trying it out in print.  His paper ‘Universalisability’ (1954/5) 
stressed one’s personal responsibility in making decisions that are also decisions of principle.  
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The next important development came in a second book, Freedom and Reason (1963), in which 
the formal features of prescriptivity and universalizability generate a ‘Golden Rule’ form of 
argument.  (As stated in Luke VI 31, this ran, ‘And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye 
also to them likewise.)  Hare offers a simple scenario (1963, 90–1): suppose that A owes money 
to B, who owes money to C, and that the law allows creditors to exact their debts by putting their 
debtors into prison.  If B simply decides ‘I will put A into prison’, there may be nothing to say to 
him.  But can he say ‘I ought to put A into prison’?  If he does, he commits himself to a principle 
such as ‘If this is the only way to exact the debt, the creditor should imprison the debtor.’  A is 
unlikely to be willing to prescribe a likely implication of this, ‘Let C put me into prison’, since 
that would frustrate his own interests.  Hare argues that the form of argument retains its force 
even if, in fact, B is not himself a debtor; for the judgment ‘I ought to put A into prison’, and the 
principle that it invokes, will still entail conditionals, such as ‘Let me be put into prison if I am 
ever in A’s situation’, to which B is unlikely to be able honestly to subscribe. 
In Freedom and Reason, Hare allows the argument to be evaded by the ‘fanatic’ who is so 
committed to some impersonal ideal (say that debtors deserve a hard time) that he is willing to 
disregard his own personal interests (including the interests that he has himself as a debtor, or 
would have if he were a debtor).  A later tightening of the argument (first set out fully in 1972c), 
hoped to close off this possibility.  In their practical force, ideals are equivalent to universal 
preferences that differ from personal preferences in their content, but owe their moral weight to 
the prevalence and intensity of whatever preferences their realization would satisfy.  That B 
would really rather go to prison himself than have debtors be treated leniently is possible, but 
improbable.  A more likely fanatic is guilty of a kind of imprudence in failing to give due weight 
to his own interests, actual or counter–factual.  The emergent ethical theory is a distinctive 
variety of utilitarianism, one that identifies the moral good with the maximization not of some 
subjective state such as happiness, but of the satisfaction of preferences. 
 The argument excited almost as much scepticism as attention.  It seemed implausible that 
the very activity of prescribing universally should commit a speaker to a substantive ethical 
position, let alone one so distinctive.  However, the logic of Hare’s position became perspicuous 
in his third book, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (1981).  It is there set out as 
follows.  In wondering whether he should assent to the statement ‘A ought to ’, the speaker has 
to reflect whether he can prescribe that everyone should act in the same way, whatever his own 
situation.  ‘I’ connotes no essence (e.g., human), each of us might be anything, and so has, when 
prescribing for all situations, actual or possible, to be concerned on behalf of everybody.  There 
is further a prescriptive aspect to the meaning of ‘I’: to take a role to be possibly one’s own, and 
to prescribe for that possible situation, is to give weight to the preferences of the occupant of that 
role as if they were actually one’s own.  Hence, the speaker can rationally assent to a particular 
‘ought’–statement only if it is derivable from some universal principle that he will accept if he 
gives impartial and positive weight to all preferences whose satisfaction would be affected by its 
observance.  Thus moral reflection generates a universalized prudence.  Moral ideals register 
within this framework simply as universal preferences; to allow one’s own ideals to override 
more intense or prevalent desires and ideals of others is a kind of egoism, and so excluded.  
Human decision remains free, however rational and informed, because anyone can avoid the 
constraints of morality by declining to moralize; for this reason, it remains true that no ‘is’ 
entails an ‘ought’. 
This is an extraordinary, and extraordinarily bold, intellectual construction, which invites 
debate at many points.  Zeno Vendler (1988, 181) urged that we keep apart the semantic thesis 
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(which may be true or nearly true) that ‘I’ is a pure indexical, from any metaphysical claim 
(which may baffle us) that it denotes a pure subject which can take on any state or role.   In his 
reply, Hare clearly shies away from adopting a metaphysical position stranger than Vendler’s 
own (which rejects Cartesian egos but does admit a transcendental ego).  Yet he still supposes it 
to be true that ‘I might be Napoleon’, and that ‘the world in which I was Napoleon would be a 
different world than this, though not in its universal properties’ (1988a, 285).  He even supposes 
that I can consider situations in which I am a stove, a mountain, or a tree – although, since I 
cannot care what happens to me if I become such a thing, the consideration is idle (1988a, 283).  
Hare seems here to have entered rather unexpected territory.  It would have suited his usual 
common sense to permit me to imagine not that I am Napoleon, but being Napoleon, i.e. what it 
was like to be Napoleon; and that can suffice to incline one to ambivalence about the outcome of 
Waterloo.  But he requires there to be a possible situation in which I am, at any rate, relevantly 
just like Napoleon if he is to maintain that prescribing, say, ‘All men like Napoleon should 
receive their come–uppance’ applies even to oneself, and so may be imprudent. 
A danger remained of deriving a kind of imperative from an indicative.  No doubt Napoleon 
very much wanted to win the battle.  Does awareness of that fact commit me to prescribing, on 
the counter–factual supposition that I am Napoleon, that Napoleon be victorious?   Here Hare 
makes further use of his thesis that the meaning of ‘I’ is partly prescriptive: to hypothesize ‘if I 
were Napoleon’ is already to ‘identify with his prescriptions’, in the sense of prescribing that, 
other things being equal, they be satisfied within the scope of the hypothesis (1981, 96–9).    
The solution is equally elegant and audacious.  It may confirm doubts whether the situation 
of my being Napoleon is a situation at all.  (For if it were a possible situation, of the same kind as 
an actual situation, how could I be logically – as opposed to humanly – constrained in what 
attitude I adopted towards it?)  It also throws open questions about what identifying with 
Napoleon’s prescriptions comes to.  One might think that, if ‘I’ is fully prescriptive, I cannot 
prescribe that Napoleon be defeated in the situation in which I am Napoleon, since that is 
certainly not what he wanted or would ever have wanted; and, if so, I cannot honestly prescribe 
that all men like Napoleon be defeated, since, for one case (that in which I am Napoleon), I do 
not want that.  What Hare requires is a weaker identification, given that I am moralizing, and 
hence prescribing for all situations of a given general kind, I must give some weight to the 
preferences that are mine in the situation in which I am Napoleon, but not more weight that I 
give to the preferences that are mine in any of the other situations; hence, in deciding what to 
prescribe universally, I must weigh all relevant preferences equally (relative to their prevalence 
and intensity).  This is exactly where Hare intends to lead us; but he invites the question how he 
can prove that one is taken that way by the logic of ‘ought’ and ‘I’. 
 
6. Attending to Preferences 
 
A related query (which Moral Thinking leaves as ‘unfinished business’, 1981, 105, cf. 1997) 
arises about the range of preferences that prescribing universally commits one to taking on 
board.  If ‘I’ is fully prescriptive, it may further follow that to suppose that I am some person is 
to take on board all his preferences, including ‘external’ ones about matters (say his neighbors’ 
sexual or dietary practices) that may never impinge upon his consciousness.  Yet sometimes 
Hare only demands impartiality between interests, which is narrower.  To accommodate 
precisely that, we might distinguish a sympathetic ‘I’: to suppose that I am some person might be 
to give full weight to his preferences regarding his own future.  This would still leave open 
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whether I should take into account his prudential preferences (now–for–then) for his future, or 
only his synchronic desires preferences (now–for–now) regarding his present state.  
Alternatively, we might admit an egocentric ‘I’, this would let us give weight to Cheops’ desire 
that he receive a big funeral after his death, but not to external desires that do not essentially 
refer to their possessor.  Yet such options embarrass if the aim was to derive a precise ethical 
theory from the very logic of the concepts. 
As Hare notes (1981, 103), restrictions upon the relevant range of preferences may have the 
effect of bringing together a utilitarianism that aims to maximize pleasure or happiness, and one 
that aims to maximize the satisfaction of preference.  Yet to have any hope of achieving this we 
would need a double restriction: the only preferences to be considered must be now–for–now or 
then–for–then, and they must be fully internal in relating only to conscious states of the subject –  
indeed, more precisely, to features of those states of which the agent is conscious, or, for short, 
what it is like to be in those states.  However, this position is doubly insecure.  First, when 
discussing the treatment of now–for–then preferences, Hare takes over from Richard Brandt the 
idea that rational agents seek to maximize the satisfaction of their present preferences after they 
have been adjusted in the light of full exposure to logic and the facts (1981, 101–5, 214–16).  
This makes the practical question for the agent not ‘What do I now prefer?’, but ‘What would I 
prefer after full exposure to logic and the facts?’  The same issue arises even with now–for–now 
preferences.  Hare discusses, though in a different context (1981, 142–4), the pleasure machine 
imagined by J.J.C Smart (1983, 18) that maximizes the pleasures of a subject through generating 
a stream of illusory but enjoyable experiences.  He sees it as an advantage of his variety of 
utilitarianism that, not being ‘formulated in terms of pleasure’, it can give weight to whether ‘we 
prefer a life for ourselves plugged into the machines to one devoted to pursuits now considered 
normal and enjoyable’ (1981, 143).  That suggests that we should give weight to now–for–now 
preferences whose objects are not restricted to conscious features of current mental states.  
Further, if we follow Brandt, we should ask not what now–for–now preferences an agent actually 
has, but which he would have after subjection to Brandt’s ‘cognitive psycho–therapy’.  Yet this 
implication may trouble us, not only because of the indefinite scope it offers to paternalism, but 
because it would seem undeterminable what an agent would want if indefinitely informed. 
The other source of insecurity is doubts about whether, within Hare’s framework, we are 
justified in restricting the relevant range of preferences.  If, in deciding what ought to be done, I 
am rationally bound to identify with the agents whose preferences, internal or external, bear on 
it, how can I fail to take on the widest range of actual preferences, now–for–then as well as now–
for–now and then–for–then, external as well as internal, and uninformed as well as informed?  
Hare inclines this way, writing ‘It is still my belief that a full account of the matter would assign 
weight to all preferences’ (1981, 103–4).  However, how might this best be done?  Let us take 
them in turn. 
 (a) Now–for–then preferences: Hare is clear that we take into account how much an agent 
prefers one thing to another, also to how many agents prefer it.  This suggests that we should also 
attend to how long an agent has a preference.  For it would seem arbitrary to count a preference 
twice if two men have it, if only for a day, but only once if one man has it for two days.  We 
might assimilate the questions how long and how many by dividing people into time–slices of an 
arbitrarily selected length, and asking how many person–slices shared some given preference.  
Yet the effect is curious.  Within the life of an individual, a preference may become overriding 
because he has entertained it for a long time, even if it has been replaced by conflicting 
preferences at the time of action.  (And the theory would not allow one to give precedence to the 
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preferences of the person–slice who acts on the grounds of agential autonomy; for agents enjoy 
no such privilege.) 
 (b) External preferences: A difficulty here is in assessing the intensity of an external 
preference that is also idle, but perhaps because the agent can do nothing towards satisfying it.  
Apparent intensity may be deceptive: it is the mark of a sentimental attitude that it may be 
warmly felt, and yet at the same time idle and insincere.  However, the same problem arises 
elsewhere; it is not peculiar to external preferences. 
 (c) Uninformed preferences: It is hard to see how Hare’s framework itself justifies 
disregarding these.  However, subjects may have a higher–level preference that, where they hold 
or lack a lower–level preference only out of ignorance, its presence or absence should be 
discounted – thought perhaps only so long as this does not give rise to a denial of autonomy 
within spheres where each of us expects to be free to act at will according to his own judgment. 
There is further unclarity in the notion of a preference.  Hare had long distinguished being in 
pain, to which one may be indifferent (if the pain is slight, or if one has undergone prefrontal 
lobotomy), and suffering, which entails having a desire (not necessarily overriding) to escape it.  
Now it is plausible to suppose that, of any variety of suffering, there is such a thing as what it is 
like to be subject to it.  (So Hare can write of a group of sufferers, ‘I shall not know what it will 
be like for them … unless I know what it is like to suffer like that’; 1981, 92.)  This applies so 
long as the desire that is an aspect of suffering is of a kind that is bound to be felt. Yet we all are 
subject to an indefinite range of desires that are dispositional; and even occurrent desires may be 
manifest in how we think or act without being felt.  Hare appears to overlook such variations 
when he writes of preferences in general, ‘If I do not feel the preference with the intensity which 
the person in the situation feels it, I have not fully represented his situation to myself’ (Seanor & 
Fotion 1988a, 288).  And yet, when he considers failures to act as one prescribes (e.g., 1981, 21–
2), he shows an awareness that how one chooses and acts can be equally indicative as anything 
one feels of what one prefers.  No doubt this could be sorted out, and precisely by recognizing 
(as Hare doubtless could have, though the language is not his) that the criteria of preference are 
multiple.  However, this would have for him two drawbacks.  First, it multiplies the possible 
ways in which one might count as ‘identifying with’ another.  Hare has written, ‘In identifying 
myself with some person either actually or hypothetically, I identify with his prescriptions’ 
(1981, 96–7).  Yet another way might be imagining what it is like to be him at some time or in 
some situation – which is different, though it may (to the extent that his preferences come to his 
mind as objects of attention) be overlapping.  Secondly, it confirms a doubt that one is likely to 
have anyway about the comparability of preferences.  If I feel like doing something but, for no 
compelling reason, fail to do it, whereas you do it without any prior or accompanying 
consciousness of the preference, who has the stronger preference to do it?  The question is liable 
to be unanswerable. 
 
7. Possible People 
 
Outside Moral Thinking itself, a striking application of Hare’s framework was to possible 
people, that is, to people who may exist, with preferences and interests to be satisfied, if we 
choose to bring them into existence.  Ought we to do so, so long as this will increase the total 
satisfaction of preference?  A positive answer has implications – though not, Hare argued, very 
radical ones – for population policy, and the morality of such practices as abortion and IVF.  
Hare reasons that, if I am glad that I exist, I tenselessly prescribe, ceteris paribus, that my 
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parents bring me into existence; universalizing the prescription, I must prescribe, ceteris paribus, 
the bringing into existence of others relevantly like me (1975, 1988b, 1988c).   
 This is intriguing, though not unproblematic.  We may be struck by its invocation, in effect, 
of past imperatives (such as Gerald Manley Hopkins’s ‘Have fair fallen, O fair, fair have fallen’, 
addressed to Henry Purcell).  Not that this is new: Hare had had already to defend them in 
prescriptivist analysis of ‘I ought to have done that’.  A further question is whether Hare has 
correctly isolated the initial attitude.  If what I am glad of is the kind of life I experience, in 
preference to there simply being less life in the world (cf. 1988c, 173–4), then, if universalization 
generates a golden–rule argument, it should indeed lead me to prescribe, ceteris paribus, creating 
other similar lives (unless it is the uniqueness of the life that I value).  But Hare also supposes 
that what Jane Doe is grateful for is that she, John Doe, exist and not someone else, even equally 
privileged, in her place (1988b, 87–8).  Yet it is less clear that we can expect her to have that 
attitude, let alone its equivalent, within Hare’s framework, of being specially glad that Dick Hare 
(or someone with all his universal qualities) exists – supposing that he is glad to exist – in that 
possible world in which she is (or has all the universal qualities of) Dick Hare.   
 
8. Levels of Moral Thinking 
 
A different feature of his theory, first presented (in different terminology) in ‘Ethical Theory and 
Utilitarianism’ (1976), and fully explored in Moral Thinking (1981), is a distinction between a 
‘critical’ level of thinking, conducted by ‘archangels’ with the use of ‘Golden Rule’ arguments, 
and an ‘intuitive’ level, conducted by ‘proles’ with the use of simple principles (often 
articulating emotional responses) whose acceptance can be justified at the critical level.  These 
two levels define not two social castes, but two roles between which each of us learns to alternate 
as appropriate.  The complication is actually inevitable within consequentialism, which has to 
separate the question how one should act from the question how one should think about how to 
act – for ways of thinking have consequences no less than ways of acting (and thinking that one 
should act in a certain way entails no success in so acting, nor even any attempt).  A utilitarian 
assessment of practical principles has to consider not only their observance utility (OU), which is 
what good will come of enacting them, but also their acceptance utility (AU), which is (roughly) 
what good will come of intending to enact them.  (Note that intending to act in a certain way is 
itself a mental act.  There is no ground here to shift to a different form of utilitarianism, ‘rule’ 
rather than ‘act’, or ‘indirect’ rather than ‘direct’; rather, so far we are simply extending act–
utilitarianism to a wider range of acts, mental as well as physical.)  A broad generalization that 
Hare favoured is that the highest OU is likely to attach to highly specific principles, though a 
higher AU may attach to some fairly general ones.  This comes of human ignorance and self–
deception.  A principle, say, permitting adultery when a marriage is breaking up anyway might 
have a higher OU than one simply forbidding adultery; but, if there are potential Don Juan’s 
around with a talent for false rationalization, its AU may be lower. 
 This complication was both convenient, and problematic.  Hare had long been wearied by 
familiar objections citing concrete cases where utilitarian theory appears to conflict with moral 
intuition, as when an American sheriff might judicially execute one suspect in order to prevent a 
mass lynching of others.  He could now hope to accommodate these at the ‘intuitive’ level of 
thinking.  An inability ever to countenance judicial murder may be recommendable by critical to 
intuitive thinking as a constraint upon practical reflection in an emergency.  And given that the 
attitude is approved, if not reasserted, by critical thinking as Hare conceives it, how can it in 
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itself tell against his conception of critical thinking?  (It would be a case, so to speak, of biting 
the hand that fed one.)   
However, there is a difficulty.  It is one thing to make do with intuitive ways of solving 
problems that are the best available within limits of time and information, while leaving them 
subject to correction at leisure or in retrospect; it is another to accept a theory that approves one’s 
actually assenting to certain principles whose contents it cannot endorse.  And yet a rule that is a 
mere ‘rule of thumb’ is a paper shield against temptation.  All is well if the theory can be self–
effacing, so that the agent discards it as and when he adopts an intuitive viewpoint; but, in Hare’s 
scenario, in which he has internalized both critical and intuitive ways of thinking, how is he to 
keep out of mind, as he tests his practical commitment to some intuitive principle, that it is 
simply not of a form (being absolute, and yet evidently equivalent to no principle of utility) to be 
critically endorsable?   
This objection was to be raised both by Williams (1988) and by J.L. Mackie (1985, 110-11) 
(cf. also, though not explicitly about Hare, Hunt 1999, § 5).  Hare anticipated it as follows: ‘To 
say that it is impossible to keep and intuitive thinking going in the same thought–process is like 
saying that in a battle a commander cannot at the same time be thinking of the details of tactics, 
the overall aim of victory, and the principles (economy of force, concentration of force, offensive 
action, etc.) which he has learnt when learning his trade’ (1981, 52; cf. 1988a, 289–90).  This is 
evidently true of what he had called ‘rules of thumb’, which an agent applies just so long as this 
remains the best way in context of achieving his goals.  However, Hare came to deprecate that 
phrase (1981, 38), and to emphasize that the ‘prima facie principles’ he prefers to speak of have 
the power to produce compunction even where their neglect, since well grounded, cannot 
produce remorse (1981, 30).  Yet how is this to work?  No doubt it is possible to combine being 
convinced both that one has to do X in some difficult situation (say when only lying will save my 
father), and that doing X remains in some significant way bad.  Yet this thought requires the 
possession of a distinctive concept of being bad whose application, on occasion, can at once lack 
the power to determine an ethical decision, and yet remain obstinately significant and 
inexpungible.  Without such a concept, talk of ‘compunction’ is out of place.  Now, Hare just 
makes room for this when he concedes that moral concepts may suffer a sea–change when they 
are applied at the intuitive and non–critical level.  The only particular proposal he makes is that 
‘ought’ becomes overridable; yet he should surely be willing to concede that quite new concepts 
may come into being – all, of course, under the arching guidance of critical thinking.  And one 
such concept might be expressed by a use of ‘morally bad’ of a kind associated with moral 
philosophies that Hare would otherwise reject. 
However, it must remain a problem that, precisely to the extent that intuitive thinking can 
draw upon conceptions of its own, a clear–eyed intuitive thinking that does not occlude the 
judgments of critical thinking must be as problematic for Hare as a clear–eyed acrasia that unites 
conscious and voluntary infringement of a prescription with continued acceptance of it.  Force 
still attaches to an objection by Williams (1988, 190): 
 
The theory ignores the fact that the responses are not merely a black–ox mechanism to 
generate what is probably the best outcome under confusing conditions.  Rather, they 
constitute a way of seeing the situation; and you cannot combine seeing the situation in that 
way, from the point of view of those dispositions, with seeing it in the archangel’s way, in 
which all that is important is maximum preference satisfaction, and the dispositions 
themselves are merely a means to that. 
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9. Traces of Positivism in Religion and Meta–ethics 
 
Hare did not suppose that the modern thinking man could long remain what he called a ‘simple 
believer’; so he welcomed attempts by R.B. Braithwaite and others to empty religion of dogmatic 
content.  He called himself a ‘Christian empiricist’, but thought the question whether he was 
really a Christian terminological.  What he retained for himself was what he once called a ‘blik’, 
an attitude to the world which somehow gave him confidence to live and think morally, trusting 
(as he put it) ‘in my own continued well–being (in some sense of that world that I may not now 
fully understand) if I continue to do what is right according to my lights’, as also ‘in the general 
likelihood of people like Hitler coming to a bad end’ (1950/1, 38).  John Hare (2002, 307) 
connects the inhibitions that held his father back from belief not just with modern scepticism, but 
with ‘a philosophical doctrine about meaning which he inherited from Carnap and the logical 
positivists’; for ‘he thought he could not make meaningful assertions about subjects, like God, 
which lay beyond the limits of possible sense experience’.  Thus he denied that the 
transcendental has anything to do with prayer, asking ‘What is the difference between there 
being a transcendental God who listens to the prayer and directs events accordingly, and it just 
being the case that the events take place?’, and answering ‘None at all’ (1973, 27).  The upshot is 
fatal to the orthodoxies of belief as of unbelief: ‘Where the transcendental is concerned, there is 
no difference between a true story and a myth; it is therefore wrong to speak of the person who 
prays having an illusion that there is somebody that he is praying to’ (ibid.).  Simple belief, it 
turns out, lacks even a content. 
 Also traceable to positivism was a recurrent tendency to doubt the substantiality of 
philosophical disagreement.  Presumably Plato was making a mistake of a kind when, as Hare 
diagnosed it, he ‘interpreted the experience which we call “having a particular mental image of a 
square” as “having, on a particular occasion, a mental look at the Square”’ (1964, 67).  Within 
meta–ethics, however, Hare was inclined to suppose that such variations fail to be more than 
verbal.  This suspicion was first expressed in an unpublished paper ‘Moral Objectivity’ (1949–
50).  Here Hare imagines a White (an objectivist) who calls ‘a moral intuition’ what a Black (a 
subjectivist) calls ‘a feeling of approval’, and wonders about the point at issue: ‘Now we may 
well ask, seeing that we are all agreed that there is this experience, no matter what you call it, 
what on earth is the point of having long philosophical arguments about what you do call it.’  
Take a case of disagreement about pacifism: ‘The Whites describe this situation by saying that 
there is a difference of opinion between us as to whether fighting does or does not possess the 
quality right; the Blacks, on the other hand, describe it by saying that we have different feelings 
about fighting.  But the situation which they are both trying to describe is precisely the same, and 
they know it … They are disagreeing merely about words.’  Hare pursued this scepticism in two 
published papers, ‘Nothing Matters’ (1959), and ‘Ontology in Ethics’ (1985).  Here he suspects 
of vacuity certain terms that get overworked, ‘true’, ‘fact’, ‘world’, ‘objective’, ‘realist’, 
‘cognitivist’; hence he thinks it much harder than many have done to define a position that is 
distinctively objectivist.  (It is certainly not enough to reassert ‘Murder is wrong’ in a peculiar 
and, as it were, metaethical tone of voice, firm and yet unemotive.)  What I have traced back to a 
verificationism that may now seem dated becomes well–grounded when applied to abstractions 
that, as appropriated by philosophers, await a clear sense. 
 
10. Afterword 
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Hare’s unpublished paper ‘Moral Objectivity’ contains a striking passage, unparalleled 
elsewhere, that confirms Lucas’s supposition (2002, 31) of a connection between his war 
experience and a vein of existentialism.  He imagines being an interpreter in a Japanese prisoner–
of–war camp who is trying to persuade the Japanese commander not to send sick people out to 
work on the railway: 
 
I ask him to visualise, not certain non–natural properties, but the very natural, real properties 
of the situations that the alternative courses of action will bring about ... It is not by any 
appeal to intuition that I can conduct my argument; … it is by revealing to him the nature of 
his choice, and showing him what it involves, what in fact he is choosing.  And when I have 
done all this, I can only leave him to choose; for it is after all his choice, not mine … At any 
rate I have myself chosen, so far as in me lies, my own way of life, my own standard of 
values, my own principle of choice.  In the end we all have to choose for ourselves; and no 
one can do it for anyone else. 
 
What makes Hare arguably unique, though at the same time closer in approach to Kant than to 
the utilitarians whose ally he became, was that he combined this insistence upon the 
ineluctability of individual choice with an optimistic view of the possibilities of making choices 
rationally.  (Indeed, he played with the idea that Kant could have been a utilitarian, 1993b.)  
What reconciles these two features of moral thinking, in his view, is nothing other than the logic 
of the practical ‘ought’.  That this is crucial and central was already a claim within ‘An Essay in 
Monism’.  There, criticizing ‘materialists’ (among whom he counts utilitarians) for letting ‘the 
word “ought” slip out of their vocabulary’, he remarks, ‘Both the Greeks of the Fourth Century 
B.C. and we in our own times have seen how quickly people like Thrasymachus spring up, and 
with what dire results, once men have forgotten the meaning of “ought”’ (ch. 19, p. 62). 
 This may already seem curious in two ways.  First, one might suppose that language is 
rather our servant than our master, and that the rationality of reasoning in the ways he 
recommends needs to be established on general grounds, and not made to depend upon theses 
about the connotations of a word.  Secondly, one of the theses in question – that practical 
‘ought’s entail imperatives – is hardly obviously true; one might rather expect an Oxford 
philosopher, in the heyday of ordinary language philosophy, to be sensitive to the objection that 
the modal ‘You ought to do X’ no more entails the imperative ‘Do X’ than the modal ‘He ought 
to have got home by now’ entails the indicative ‘He has got home by now.’  (Think how much 
more plausible it is to infer the second from ‘He must have got home by now.’) 
 Hare had replies to both objections, which he sets out briefly in Moral Thinking (1981).  He 
insists that we need our words to mean what they do mean if we are to answer the questions that 
we want to ask, ‘If we were to alter the meaning of our words, we should be altering the 
questions we were asking, and perhaps answering, in terms of them … If we go trying to answer 
those questions, we are stuck with those concepts’ (1981, 18).  And yet, at the same time, he 
asserts no more than that the practical ‘ought’ is a ‘near neighbour’ to the deontic ‘must’ (1981, 
7), acknowledging that ‘it is much odder to say “I must” at the moment at which one is 
backsliding (i.e. doing what one says one must not do) than it is to do this with “ought”’ (1981, 
24).  Here he may seem to vacillate between two different roles, that of describing our language 
as it is, and that of tightening it in order to make it more rigorous.  Perhaps one may reconcile 
these through making much of the following qualification: ‘But “ought” aspires to the status of 
“much”, and … in rigorous, critical moral reasoning has to be used like it’ (1981, 24).  In Hare’s 
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view, it is human weakness that is served better by ‘ought’ than by ‘must’, and we reveal our 
commitment to the logic of ‘must’ in uses of ‘ought’ that fall short of that logic, and yet 
constantly aspire to live up to it.  ‘Intuitive’ thinking may be as necessary as ‘critical’, and yet it 
is never such as to enjoy a secure resting–place in our hearts and minds. 
 At the heart of Hare’s ethical theory, therefore, lies a vision of human beings as unable to 
live up to a way of thinking towards which they are nonetheless ineluctably drawn.  He perceives 
a drama inherent in the human condition to which no fully integrated and unified system could 
do justice.  His philosophy is currently somewhat out of fashion, in part through a reversion to 
various forms of cognitivism in ethics, in part through changes in the style of philosophy, which 
now pursues the clarity that he desired through a new complexity and professionalization.  At 
least in the short term, it is probable, and in accord with the ‘strange dream’ from which we 
started, that his thinking will come to be viewed from a distance, as playing a once important 
role within the non–cognitivist strain in ethics that was dominant through much of the 20th 
century.  And yet it may yet come to hold the attention of a new audience through its recognition 
of the tensions inherent in any practical thinking that responds without complacency to the 
limitations of our moral capacities. 
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